Alice and Bob want to run a protocol over an unreliable channel, where a certain number of bits are flipped adversarially. Several results take a protocol requiring L bits of noise-free communication and make it robust over such a channel. In a recent breakthrough result, Haeupler described an algorithm that sends a number of bits that is conjectured to be near optimal in such a model. However, his algorithm critically requires a priori knowledge of the number of bits that will be flipped by the adversary.
Introduction
How can two parties run a protocol over a noisy channel? Interactive communication seeks to solve this problem while minimizing the total number of bits sent. Recently, Haeupler [12] gave an algorithm for this problem that is conjectured to be optimal. However, as in previous work [1, 2, 5, 7, [9] [10] [11] 19] , his algorithm critically relies on the assumption that the algorithm knows the noise rate in advance, i.e., the algorithm knows in advance the number of bits that will be flipped by the adversary.
In this paper, we remove this assumption. To do so, we add a new assumption of privacy. In particular, in our model, an adversary can flip an unknown number of bits, at arbitrary times, but he never learns the value of any bits sent over the channel. In Theorem 4 (Section A), we show this assumption is necessary: with a public channel and unknown noise rate, the adversary can run a man-in-the-middle attack to mislead either party. Problem Overview. We assume that Alice and Bob are connected by a noisy binary channel. Our goal is to build an algorithm that takes as input some distributed protocol π that works over a noise-free channel and outputs a distributed protocol π ′ that works over the noisy channel.
We assume an adversary chooses π, and which bits to flip in the noisy channel. The adversary knows our algorithm for transforming π to π ′ , and thus he knows π ′ . However, he neither knows the private random bits of Alice and Bob, nor the bits sent over the channel, except when it is possible to infer these from knowledge of π ′ .
We let T be the number of bits flipped by the adversary, and L be the length of π. As in previous work, we assume that Alice and Bob know L.
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The closest prior work to ours is that of Haeupler [12] . His work considers a fixed and known adversarial noise rate ǫ, the fraction of bits flipped by the adversary. Communication efficiency is measured by communication rate which is L divided by the total number of bits sent. Haeupler [12] describes an algorithm that achieves a communication rate of 1 − O( ǫ log log(1/ǫ), which he conjectures to be optimal. We compare our work to his in Section 4.
An interesting problem related to interactive computation was considered recently by Feinerman, Haeupler and Korman in [?] . They consider the problem of spreading a rumor of a single bit in a noisy network. In each synchronous round, each agent can deliver a 1 bit message to a random anonymous agent, but this bit is flipped independently at random with probability 1/2 − ǫ for some fixed ǫ > 0. They give an algorithm that with high probability ensures all nodes learn the correct rumor. This algorithm requires O(log n/ǫ 2 ) rounds and O(n log n/ǫ 2 )) messages. They also give a majority-consensus algorithm with the same resource costs, and prove these resource costs are optimal for both problems.
Our Algorithm
In this section, we first provide a formal definition of our model. We then summarize the main components involved in the construction of our algorithm along with the intuition behind our design.
Formal Model
Our algorithm takes as input a protocol π which is a sequence of L bits, each of which is transmitted either from Alice to Bob or from Bob to Alice. As in previous work, we also assume that Alice and Bob both know L. We let Alice be the party who sends the first bit in π. Channel Steps. As in previous work, we assume communication over the channel is synchronous and individual computation is instantaneous. We define a channel step as the amount of time that it takes to send one bit over the channel. Silence on the Channel. When neither Alice nor Bob sends in a channel step, we say that the channel is silent. In any contiguous sequence of silent channel steps, the bit received on the channel in the first step is set by the adversary for free. By default, the bit received in subsequent steps of the sequence remains the same, unless the adversary pays for one bit flip in order to change it. In short, the adversary pays a cost of one bit flip each time it wants to change the value of the bit received in any contiguous sequence of silent steps.
Overview, Notation and Definitions
Our algorithm is presented as Algorithm 15. The overall idea of the algorithm is simple: the parties run the original protocol π for b steps as if there was no noise. Then, they verify whether an error has occurred or not by checking the fingerprints. Based on the result of this verification procedure, the computation of π either moves forward b steps or is rewound b steps. We now define some notation. Fingerprints. To verify communication, our algorithm uses randomized hash functions as described in the following well-known theorem. Theorem 2. (Naor and Naor [14, 15] ) For any positive integer L and any probability p, there exists a hash function F that given a uniformly at random bit string S as the seed, maps any string of length at most L bits to a bit string hash value H, such that the collision probability of any two strings is at most p, and the length of S and H are |S| = Θ(log(L/p)) and |H| = Θ(log(1/p)) bits respectively.
Transcripts. We define Alice's transcript, T A , as the sequence of possible bits of π that Alice has either sent or received up to the current time. Similarly, we let T B denote Bob's transcript of π. For either Alice or Bob, we define a verified transcript to be the longest prefix of a transcript for which a verified fingerprint has been received. We note that the verified transcripts for Alice and Bob as T * A and T * B respectively. Blocks. We define a block as b contiguous bits of protocol π that are run during Line 8 of Alice's protocol. The value b denotes the size of the block which is set by Alice and decreases based on the number of blocks in which she detects a corruption. Rounds. We define a round as one iteration of the repeat loop in Alice's protocol. This loop starts at Line 2 and ends at Line 12. A round consists of executing b channel steps of π (a block), as well as sending and receiving some fingerprints required for verification purposes. Other Notation. For a transcript T and integer x, we define T [0, . . . , x] to be the the first x bits of T if T is of length at least x. Otherwise, we define T [0, . . . , x] as null. For two strings x and y, we define x ⊙ y to be the concatenation of x and y.
We define the function getH based on Theorem 2. When given a probability p, getH returns the following tuple (h, ℓ h , ℓ s ), where h denotes the hash function from Theorem 2; ℓ h is |H|, the size of the output of the hash function; and ℓ s is |S|, the size of the random seed. The probability used in getH is 1 (Lx) c for some c ≥ 2.
Algorithm Design
At the start of each round, Alice chooses a random seed S A and sends (1) S A ; (2) H A which is the fingerprint of T A ; and (3) |T A | which is size of T A . This allows Bob to determine which block of the π they should compute. Next, Alice and Bob continue the computation of π for b steps as if the channel was noiseless. Finally, Bob sends H B that is the hash of T B using the same seed S A previously received from Alice. Alice listens for the hash value from Bob and checks if it matches her own transcript. If she receives a correct fingerprint, she proceeds to the next round. If she does not receive it, she rewinds the transcript T A by b steps, decreases the value of b, and begins a new round. Adaptive Block Size. The block size b decreases each time Alice fails to receive a correct fingerprint from Bob. We can use our lower-bound to calculate how to decrease the b during the protocol. To prevent progress in computation of π in a round, it suffices to corrupt a single bit in the round. Drawing intuition from our lower bound, we want our algorithm to send L +Θ( √ LT ) bits. Thus, we initially set b = √ L, and after t errors, we set b = L/t.
Adapting the block size is critical to achieving a good communication rate, but it raises a new challenge: How can Alice and Bob agree on the current block size? Our solution is to make Alice authoritative on the current block size. Therefore, while Alice knows the start and the end of each block, Bob may not.
Algorithm 1: Interactive Communication

ALICE'S PROTOCOL
Data: π ← L-step protocol to be simulated augmented by 2 √ L extra steps of sending random bits; x is the channel step number; 1 Initialization:
SA ← ℓs uniformly random bits; 
To overcome this problem, Alice includes the block size at the start of each block. If Bob detects an error, he enters into a "listening loop". During this time, Bob continually checks all received bits and exits the loop if a valid fingerprint is received. Alice, having not received a correct fingerprint from Bob, will rewind all the bits added to her transcript in the current round and reduce the current block size. Intuitively, this ensures that (1) Alice is never more than one block ahead of Bob, and (2) Bob is always allowed to "catch up" to Alice.
Adapting Fingerprint Size. Due to the rewinding of blocks, the execution time of our algorithm depends on the unknown value T . But a fixed-sized fingerprint will fail if the adversary selects T sufficiently large. How can we guarantee correctness over lengthy execution times?
First, let us describe the problem if the fingerprint size is always Θ(log L) with a collision probability of 1 L c . The adversary can choose T = ω(L c ) and flip one bit in each block. Since Alice and Bob should send at least ω(T ) blocks to make sure they can compute π, the probability of failure due to hash collision is not negligible anymore. To deal with this problem, we adaptively increase the fingerprint size based on the channel step. This decreases the collision probability of each additional fingerprint, and ensures the collision probability of all the fingerprints in the protocol remains o (1) . Let x be the number of channel steps used by the protocol so far. We use a family of hash functions with |S| = |H| = Θ(log(Lx)) and the probability of failure of p = 1 (Lx) c . Handling Termination. In previous work, since ǫ and L ′ are known, both parties know when to terminate and can do so at the same time. However, since we know neither parameter, termination is more challenging for our setting.
In our algorithm, π is padded with 2 √ L additional bits at the end. Each of these bits is set independently and uniformly at random by Alice. Alice terminates when her transcript is of length equal to L + √ L. Bob terminates when (1) his verified transcript is of length L, and (2) he has received a sequence of 10 log x consecutive bits that are all the same.
Proof of Theorem 1
Before proceeding to our proof, we define the following bad events.
• Event 1 -Adversarial or Non-adversarial Hash Collision: In some round, there is a hash collision as defined in Theorem 2 or the adversary flips bits in such a way as to cause a false positive when Alice or Bob checks the hash function. • Event 2 -Adversary flips bits in the last 2 √ L padded random bits of π sent by Alice such that Bob receives 10 log x consecutive bits that are all the same.
In Section 3.1, we prove the correctness of our algorithm conditioned on neither of these bad events occurring. We prove an upper bound on the probabilities of these events in Section 3.2.
Proof of Correctness Lemma 1. In Line 5 of Bob's algorithm, there is only one possible value for
Proof. We give a proof by contradiction. We assume that there are two values x ′ and x ′′ that meet the two conditions of Line 5. Thus,
Without loss of generality, let
Proof. In each round, Alice adds b bits to T A . At the end of the round, she either keeps these b bits if there is a fingerprint match or rewinds b bits if not.
⊓ ⊔
For two transcripts T and T ′ , we denote T T ′ if and only if T is a prefix of T ′ .
Lemma 3.
Our algorithm has the following properties:
1. When Alice is in Line 2 through Line 6 of her protocol, Bob is listening on the channel.
When Alice is in Line 2 through Line 6 of her protocol and also at the end of each round, T
A T B . 3. It is always the case that |T A | − b ≤ |T * B | ≤ |T A |.
Alice terminates before Bob.
Proof. We show this by induction on the number of times that Alice executes Line 6.
Base Case: If i = 0, then T A = T B = T * B = null, and Bob is listening at the start of his protocol, so all of the lemma's statements hold.
Inductive hypothesis:
We assume the lemma is true through executing Line 6 in round i − 1.
Inductive
Step: In Line 6 of round i − 1, Alice sends a fingerprint. By the inductive hypothesis, Bob is listening at this point. We do a case analysis:
• Case 1: Bob does not verify the fingerprint Alice sends. In this case, Bob will continue listening in his repeat loop for the entire time that Alice completes round i − 1 and continues to Line 6 of round i. Bob will not update T B and T * B in round i − 1 and up to Line 6 of round i. After Line 6 of round i − 1, Alice continues computation of π for b steps, but the value H ′ B received in Line 9 will not match her own transcript. Thus, she will undo the updates to her transcript. Therefore, all of the lemma statements hold from Line 6 of round i − 1 up to Line 6 of round i. 
This means that either Alice terminates in the round that |T * B | ≥ L, or she sends extra random bits to Bob for one more round. Since Event 2 does not occur, we know that Bob will not terminate until after Alice has finished sending these random bits.
⊓ ⊔
In the following lemmas, we say that a round is successful if T A increases by b bits at the end of the round, i.e., a successful round simulates one block of π. Proof. There are T total bit flips, so bit flips occur in at most T rounds. Thus, by Lemma 5, at most T rounds are not successful. The value of b decreases only in rounds that are not successful, so the value of b never gets smaller than L T +1 .
By definition of a successful round, T A increases by b steps in such a round. So, the number of successful rounds until
We first calculate the number of fingerprint bits sent by Alice and Bob in these rounds. Let x i denote the number of channel steps that have elapsed when Alice or Bob is sending the fingerprint in round i. Note that any block is of size at most √ L and at least log L. We let the size of the fingerprint be equal to c 1 log Lx i for some constant Lemma 7) . So, the total number of fingerprint bits sent is no more than
We now count the number of channel steps (called x A ) until Alice terminates. This will be L + √ L plus the number of bits sent in rounds that were not successful plus the number of bits sent for fingerprints, i.e.,
By Lemma 3, |T A | − b ≤ |T * B | at each channel step. Thus, in the round that Alice terminates, |T * B | ≥ L since b is at most √ L. Bob terminates when, in some step x, he has seen 10 log x consecutive bits that are all the same. Let x B be the time when Bob terminates. After Alice terminates, the adversary must flip at least one bit every 10 log x B channel steps. So,
Note that,
.
By substituting x A and x B in the left side of Formula 1,
This is a contradiction if c 4 α > c 6 log α or α log α > c6 c4 . This means that α must be smaller than a constant depending only on c 6 and c 4 .
⊓ ⊔ Lemma 7. The size of the fingerprints that Alice or Bob send in round i is Θ(log Li).
The proof is fairly technical and is moved to the appendix.
Lemma 8. If a party terminates, its output will be correct.
Proof. Conditioned on both Event 1 and Event 2 not happening, all bits added to T * A and T * B have already been verified to be correct. Upon termination, both |T * A | and |T * B | are of size at least L by the termination conditions. Thus, upon termination both Alice and Bob will have the first L bits of π which is all needed to have a correct output. ⊓ ⊔
Probabilities of Bad Events
We now prove that the events described at the beginning of Section 3 happen with probability o(1).
Lemma 9. The probability that Event 1 occur is o(1).
Proof. Note that the randomness of the seed S is chosen fresh by Alice for 2 fingerprints and the adversary never learns these random bits. Thus, even if the adversary changes the bits in the block and the bits in the fingerprint, the probability of any type of hash collision (either adversarial or non-adversarial) for those two fingerprints is at most 2/(Lx) c , where x is the channel step in which Alice set the hash function.
Let ξ be the event that there is any type of hash collision for any of the hash functions and random seeds chosen by Alice. We have Proof. Let ξ be the event that Bob receives 10 log x bits that are all the same after |T * B | ≥ L, but before Alice terminates. For a fixed channel step x, the probability that the last 10 log x random bits sent by Alice were flipped so that they are all the same when received by Bob is 2/x 10 . Thus, by a union bound, P r(ξ) ≤ How do our results compare with [12] ? As noted above, a direct comparison is only possible when T = O(L). Restating our algorithm in terms of ǫ, we have the following theorem whose proof is in Section A. Our algorithm has the property that a noise rate greater than 1/ log L gives communication rate no less than a noise rate of 1/ log L. In particular, it does not help the adversary to flip more than 1 bit per block.
The above communication rate is meaningful when ǫ ≤ 1/ log 2 L. An optimized version of our algorithm, not included here for ease of presentation 4 , achieves, for T < L, a communication rate of 1−O 1 √ L + √ ǫ log L . This communication rate is always positive, and hence meaningful. A Note on Fingerprint Size. A natural question is whether more powerful probabilistic techniques than union bound could enable us to use smaller fingerprints as done in [12] . The variability of block sizes poses a challenge to this approach since Alice and Bob must either agree on the current block size, or be able to recover from a disagreement by asking Bob to stay in the listening loop so he can receive Alice's message. If their transcripts diverge by more than a constant number of blocks, it may be difficult to make such a recovery, and therefore it seems challenging to modify our algorithm to use smaller fingerprints. However, it is a direction for further investigation.
Conclusion
We have described the first algorithm for interactive communication that tolerates an unknown but finite amount of noise. Against an adversary that flips T bits, our algorithm sends L + O (T + √ LT + L) log(LT + L) bits in expectation where L is the transcript length of the computation. We prove this is optimal up to logarithmic factors, assuming a conjectured lower bound by Haeupler. Our algorithm critically relies on the assumption of a private channel, an assumption that we show is necessary in order to tolerate an unknown noise rate.
Several open problems remain including the following. First, can we adapt our results to interactive communication that involves more than two parties? Second, can we more efficiently handle an unknown amount of stochastic noise? Finally, for any algorithm, what are the optimal tradeoffs between the overhead incurred when T = 0 and the overhead incurred for T > 0?
We prove that a private channel is necessary in our setting. Theorem 4. Consider any algorithm for interactive communication over a public channel that works with unknown T and always terminates in the noise-free case. Any such algorithm succeeds with probability at most 1/2.
Proof. The adversary chooses some protocol π with transcript length L and some separate "corrupted" protocol π c such that 1) π C has transcript length L and 2) Bob's individual input for π c is equivalent to his individual input for π. The goal of the adversary will be to convince Bob that π c is the protocol, rather than π. Note that we can always choose some appropriate pair π and π c meeting the above criteria.
Assume that if π c is the protocol and there is no noise on the channel, then Bob will output π c with probability at least 1/2; if not, then the theorem is trivially true. Then, the adversary sets π to be the input protocol. Next, the adversary simulates Alice in the case where her input protocol is π c , and sets the bits received by Bob to be the bits that would be sent by Alice in such a case.
Since the the algorithm eventually terminates, Bob will halt after some finite number of rounds, X. Using the above strategy, Bob will incorrectly output π c with probability at least 1/2 and the value of T will be no more than X.
Note that in the above, we critically rely on the fact that T is unknown to Bob. ⊓ ⊔
We now prove Theorem 3 that states when the number of errors is less than L our algorithm achieves a communication rate of
Proof. Our algorithm guarantees that
Since T < L we have T < L(T + 1) < √ LT + √ L and this means that for some constant C > 0,
Let ǫ = T /L ′ and R = L/L ′ be the effective noise and communication rates respectively. Then,
where the last line follows because 1/
Recall x i denotes the number of channel steps that have elapsed when Alice or Bob send the fingerprint in round i. We now prove Lemma 7 that states log Lx i = θ(log Li). Proof. Note that any block is of size at most √ L and at least log L. We let the size of the fingerprint be equal to c 1 log Lx i for some constant c 1 > 0. Then, i(log L +
. Alice and Bob send fingerprints while Alice has not terminated yet. Let t i be the number of unsuccessful rounds. So, t i ≤ i. We first calculate a very rough upper bound for x i based on t i and L. Let x i = λL 2 (t i + 1) 2 log (Lt i + L) for some λ ≥ 1. Note that, we do not assume λ is a constant but our goal is to show that λ = O(1). Each round of the protocol up to now consists of at most √ L + c 1 log Lx i channel steps. Moreover, in each successful round the parties compute at least log L bits of π and Alice terminates after at most L+ √ L log L successful rounds. Therefore,
By simplifying the above formula,
for some constant c 2 that only depends on c 1 . By substituting for x i ,
Thus,
which is only satisfiable if λ = O(1). This means that
. Moreover, t i ≤ i So, we can asymptotically bound the size of the fingerprint c 1 log Lx i ,
⊓ ⊔
B Lower Bounds
In this section, we prove a lower bound that demonstrates the near optimality of our upper bound by assuming the following conjecture by Haeupler holds [12] . We now restate Haeupler's conjecture. Conjecture 1. (Haeupler [12] , 2014) The maximal rate achievable by an interactive coding scheme for any binary error channel with random or oblivious errors is 1 − Θ( √ ǫ) for a noise rate ǫ → 0. This also holds for for fully adversarial binary error channels if the adversary is computationally bounded or if parties have access to shared randomness that is unknown to the channel.
For the remainder of this section, we assume that Haeupler's conjecture holds for any algorithm that succeed with high probability in L with an expected cost of at most L ′ under adversarial noise. For ease of exposition, we omit such statements in all of our claims below. By robust interactive communication, we mean interactive communication tolerates T errors. We begin by showing the near optimality of Algorithm 15 with respect to the communication rate achieved:
Theorem 5. Any algorithm for robust interactive communication must have L
Proof. Let T ≥ 1 be any value such that T /L ′ = o(1). Then, Haeupler's Conjecture applies and the expected total number of bits sent is
This implies that L/L ′ ≤ 1/(1 + d T /L ′ ). Now observe that 1/(1 + x) = 1/(1 − (−x)) ≤ 1 − x + x 2 for |x| < 1, again by the sum of a geometric series. Plugging in d T /L ′ for x, we have 1/
We then derive:
. Assume that given any algorithm A for interactive computation, we create a new algorithm A' that has expected value of L ′ = O(L). To do this, A' checks based on ǫ and L whether or not Haeupler's algorithm [12] will send fewer bits in expectation than A. If so it runs Haeupler's algorithm. Note that the expected number of bits sent by A' is no more than the expected number of bits sent by A.
Note that T = ǫL ′ and for algorithm A', the expected value of L ′ = O(L). This implies that implies that T = ǫO(L) or T = O(L). Since T < L, it holds that √ LT = Θ(T + √ LT ) which completes the proof. ⊓ ⊔
B.1 Additional Lower Bounds
Any algorithm for interactive communication must incur a cost of at least L to execute π on a noisy channel. Beyond that baseline cost, how much overhead is unavoidable?
We can express the overhead incurred by an algorithm as the sum of two functions: ρ(L, T ) referred to as the robustness function, and τ (L) referred to as the efficiency function. The robustness function ρ is parameterized by T and intuitively captures the relative performance of either Alice or Bob versus the adversary in the case when T ≥ 1. However, the efficiency function τ is not a function of T , and it captures the upfront cost in the case where T = 0; that is, τ provides a measure of efficiency in the absence (but under the threat) of an attack. This notation provides a useful way to view cost in these two cases.
For example, considering T ≤ L, our algorithm in Section 2 has functions of the form ρ = Θ( √ L T log L + T log L) and τ = Θ( √ L log L). Using this notation, we can rewrite Theorem 5 in terms of ρ + τ ; we omit the O(T ) term as it does not aid our argument.
Theorem 6. Any algorithm for robust interactive communication must have
Intuitively, there is a trade-off between ρ(L, T ) and τ (L), but knowing the nature of this trade-off has value. Even limited a priori knowledge of the error rate can inform the choice of algorithm used for interactive communication.
To what extent can both of these quantities be minimized? To answer this question, we characterize the trade-off between these two important quantities and prove a fundamental limit on the efficiency of resource-competitive algorithms for interactive communication. Throughout the following, we will often simplify our notation and use ρ and τ to denote ρ(L, T ) and τ (L), respectively. For a particular algorithm A, we may refer to the corresponding robustness and efficiency functions by ρ A and τ A . Preliminaries. Throughout this section, we consider a general class of algorithms that have functions of the form ρ = Θ(L α T γ + L λ T ) and τ = Θ(L β /f ) for α, β ∈ [0, 1], γ ∈ [0, 1), and λ ∈ [0, α) and where f denotes any slow-growing function of L so long as f (L) = ω(1).
The forms of ρ and τ are general, and note that α, γ, β, and λ need not be constants. Overview of Argument. Throughout this section, we assume the adversarial model. Since Theorem 6 holds true for any T ≥ 1 such that the noise rate goes to zero, we set up arguments that specify the number of bit flips T * satisfying this constraint. Note that for such a chosen number of errors, we have an algorithm with a particular L ′ that depends on L and T ; therefore, we can always find an L that gives us the noise rate necessary for Haeupler's conjectured lower bound.
The only other parameter that we control is f subject to f = ω (1) . Our approach to proving lower bounds relies on specifying a T * and leveraging f such that we uncover relationships between α, β, γ and λ that, if not obeyed, would lead to a violation of Theorem 6. These relationships will reveal that the product ρ τ = Ω(L T γ /f ) which characterizes the trade off between ρ and τ .
The next lemma provides a useful tool because it applies whenever α ≥ 1/2. Here, setting T * = 1, the main insight is that if an algorithm A has ρ A = Θ(L α T γ + L λ T ) = Θ(L 1/2 ) and τ = o(L 1−α ) = o(L 1/2 ), then we may create a new algorithm A ′ by "cutting" Π into pieces (the number of which depends on f ) and running A on each piece. This yields ρ A ′ = o(L 1/2 ) and τ = o(L 1/2 ) which violates the lower bound of Theorem 6.
Lemma 11. Consider an algorithm for robust interactive communication in the adver-
We will derive a contradiction.
Assume T * = 1. Cut Π into pieces Π j of size L 1/(2α) /f . Construct A ′ by executing A on each of the pieces Π 1 , Π 2 , ..., Π L 1−(1/(2α)) f and, if failure occurs on any piece, then Alice and Bob re-run A on that piece.
Algorithm A ′ has the robustness function Since Lemma 11 proves that ρ τ = Ω(L T γ /f ) for α ∈ [1/2, 1], we must investigate the range α ∈ [0, 1/2). To do so directly appears difficult, and our approach requires an indirect approach by focusing on γ. To this end, the following lemma is another useful tool that holds for any γ ∈ [0, 1).
Lemma 12.
For γ ∈ [0, 1), consider any algorithm for robust interactive communication in the adversarial model with ρ = Θ(L α T γ + L λ T ) and τ = Θ(L β /f ). If 1 2 ( log f log L + 1) < β ≤ 1, there exists T * such that at least one of the following properties holds: We must have ρ(L, T * ) + τ = Ω(L β / √ f ) to avoid contradicting the above lower bound. Since τ = o(L β / √ f ), at least one of the following is true:
f (we explicitly note that any constants are absorbed into the asymptotic notation and do not affect our analysis of the exponents). We examine both cases:
For β ≤ 1 2 ( log f log L + 1), set T * = 1. Again, Theorem 6 implies that ρ + τ = Ω(L 1/2 ). Since τ = o(L 1/2 ), to avoid contradicting the lower bound it must be that L α T * γ = L α = Ω(L 1/2 ) or L λ T * = L λ = Ω(L 1/2 ). This implies α ≥ 1/2 or λ ≥ 1/2 (possibly both). Since λ ∈ [0, α), we must have α > λ ≥ 1/2.
⊓ ⊔
The argument proceeds by examining the disjoint cases where γ ∈ [ 1 2 , 1) and then where γ ∈ [0, 1 2 ). In each case, Lemmas 11 and 12 are applied to achieve lower bounds on ρ τ . Proof. First, consider the case where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 2 ( log f log L + 1). By Lemma 12, α ≥ 1/2 for any γ ≥ 1/2 (particularly, when γ = 1/2). Furthermore, since α ≥ 1/2, Lemma 11 implies the existence of a T * such that ρ τ = Ω(LT * γ /f ).
Second, consider the case where 1 2 ( log f log L + 1) < β ≤ 1. By Lemma 12, there exists T * such that at least one of the following properties holds:
Else, assume Property (1) holds. To begin, note that if γ = 1/2, then β(2γ − 1)
Let us consider the portion γ−α 2γ−1 . For α = 1/2, the function value is γ−(1/2) 2γ−1 = (1/2)(2γ−1) 2γ−1 = 1 2 and no discontinuity exists regardless of the value of γ. However, when 0 ≤ α < 1/2 or 1/2 < α ≤ 1, then a discontinuity always exists at γ = 1/2. We consider each of these ranges:
• 0 ≤ α < 1/2. Note that γ−α 2γ−1 is positive and decreasing over the range γ ∈ (1/2, 1]. Therefore, γ−α 2γ−1 attains its minimum at γ = 1. It follows that the weakest lower bound for β ≥ γ−α Proof. We consider the following two cases: Case I. α ≥ 1/2. Lemma 11 implies the desired result.
Case II. α < 1/2. First, assume that 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 2 ( log f log L + 1). Then, Lemma 12 implies α ≥ 1/2 which contradicts the assumption that α < 1/2 in Case II.
Second, assume that 1 2 ( log f log L + 1) < β ≤ 1. By Lemma 12, there exists T * such that at least one of the following properties holds:
• Property (1). β(2γ − 1) ≥ γ − α + (γ − 1
2 ) log f log L
• Property (2). β ≥ 1 − λ
We are going to show by contradiction that inequality (1) cannot hold. Noting that (2γ − 1) < 0 for our range of γ ∈ [0, 1 2 ), we can rearrange inequality (2) to obtain β(1 − 2γ) ≤ α − γ − (γ − 1
2 ) log f log L = α − γ + log f log L ( 1 2 − γ). Therefore, β ≤ (α − γ + log f log L ( 1 2 − γ))/(1 − 2γ). We now want the tightest upper bound on β obtainable for any γ ∈ [0, 1/2):
However, for any finite L, this leads to the contradictory statement 1 2 ( log f log L + 1) < β < Proof. No matter the algorithm with particular α, β, λ, γ, Lemmas 13 and 14 prove there is always some T * such that ρ τ = Ω(L T * γ ). Therefore, for ρ = Θ(L α T γ + L λ T ), we have τ = Ω(L min{1−α, 1−λ} /f (L)). Since α > λ, it follows that 1 − α < 1 − λ and the result follows.
For algorithms that fall under our broad characterization, Theorem 7 can be used to prove that Algorithm 15 in Section 2 is near optimal with respect to the efficiency and robustness functions.
Theorem 8. Over all algorithms with γ = 1/2, let algorithm A have the smallest robustness function denoted by ρ OPT and let A ′ have the smallest efficiency function denoted by τ OPT . Then, Algorithm 15 is within an O(log L)-factor and an O(f log 2 L)factor from ρ OPT and τ OPT , respectively.
Proof. We treat each component separately: Near optimality of ρ. By Lemma 13, if γ = 1/2, then α ≥ 1/2 for any algorithm. Algorithm 15 has α = 1 2 + log log L log L implying a deviation from ρ OPT by at most a O(log L) factor. Since our upper bound has λ = log log L log L , we trivially conclude that we deviate by at most a O(log L) factor from the optimal value again. Therefore, for ρ is within a O(log L)-factor of optimal.
Near optimality of τ . For our upper bound, we can certainly write τ = Θ( √ L log L) in the form Θ(L β /f ) for any f by setting β = 1 2 + log f log L + log log L log L . Since 1 − α = 1 2 − log log L log L , by applying Theorem 7 we have that τ = Ω L 1/2 f log L . Therefore, τ is within an O(f log 2 L)-factor of optimal.
⊓ ⊔ This optimality result is quite strong since A and A ′ can be different algorithms. Not only is our algorithm near optimal for any single algorithm with γ = 1/2, it is near optimal compared to any optimal ρ component and any optimal τ component, where these might not be exhibited by any single algorithm.
